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DOMESTIC LAW
I. EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION OF MArrAL PROPERTY
A. Factors for Determining Equitable Distribution of
Marital Property
The primary importance of the Shaluly v. Shaluly1 decision
lies not in the supreme court's resolution of the particular dis-
pute, but in its adoption of thirteen considerations in determin-
ing an equitable distribution. While the court does not declare
the list of factors 2 to be exhaustive or elaborate on the weight to
be given each particular factor, the court has provided a frame-
work of resolution for the family court judge and the domestic
1. 284 S.C. 71, 325 S.E.2d 66 (1985).
2. In establishing these factors, the court relied on Painter v. Painter, 65 N.J. 196,
320 A.2d 484 (1974). The factors are as follows:
(1) [R]espective age, background and earning ability of the parties; (2) dura-
tion of the marriage; (3) the standard of living of the parties during the mar-
riage; (4) what money or property each brought into the marriage; (5) the pre-
sent income of the parties; (6) the property acquired during the marriage by
either or both parties; (7) the source of acquisition; (8) the current value and
income producing capacity of the property; (9) the debts and liabilities of the
parties to the marriage; (10) the present mental and physical health of the
parties; (11) the probability of continuing present employment at present earn-
ing or better in the future; (12) effect of distribution of assets on the ability to
pay alimony and support; and (13) gifts from one spouse to the other during
marriage.
284 S.C. at 75, 325 S.E.2d at 68. In Painter the Supreme Court of New Jersey applied
guidelines that had been used by the trial judge. 65 N.J. at 211, 320 A.2d at 492; see
Painter v. Painter, 118 N.J. Super. at 335, 287 A.2d at 469. Criteria similar to those
applied in both Painter and Shaluly have been incorporated into the Uniform Marriage
and Divorce Act. Section 307 of that act provides as follows:
In a proceeding for dissolution of the marriage, . . . [iut [the court] . . .
shall divide community property, without regard to marital misconduct, in just
proportions after considering all relevant factors including:
(1) Contribution of each spouse to the acquisition of the marital property;
(2) value of the property set apart to each spouse;
(3) duration of the marriage; and
(4) economic circumstances of each spouse when the division of property is
to become effective . . ..
UNIF. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE AcT § 307, 9A U.L.A. 143 (1979), noted in Painter, 65 N.J.
at 212, 320 A.2d at 492.
1
Rights et al.: Domestic Law
Published by Scholar Commons,
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
attorney in distributing marital property.3
The adoption of these criteria arose in the context of a dis-
pute over the large share of marital property a husband had re-
ceived by order of the trial judge. The record indicates that the
value of the marital property available for equitable distribution
ranged from $695,000 to $1,375,000. 4 Assuming the lowest figure
was adopted by the trial court, the husband was awarded
$530,000 (76% of the total value) and the wife was awarded
$165,000 (24% of the total value). The percentages change only
slightly if the higher valuation is substituted as the adopted val-
uation.6 Without deciding which valuation to use, the supreme
court found it clear that the husband's distributive share con-
sisted of almost all of the marital income-producing property.
Thus, it awarded the wife an additional $60,000 of the $200,000
of tax-free bonds originally awarded to the husband. That
amount was to be accompanied by the interest earned on the
$60,000 as of the date of the transfer along with the cost of the
appeal.
7
If South Carolina family court judges weigh the factors
listed in Shaluly as they have been weighed in other jurisdic-
tions, primary consideration will be given to the contribution
each party made to the "acquisition, preservation and apprecia-
tion" of the property.8 The factors considered, other than the
source of acquisition, vary widely from jurisdiction to jurisdic-
3. The court of appeals had previously referred to the factors test in at least seven
instances. See Trowell v. Trowell, 287 S.C. 611, 340 S.E.2d 553 (Ct. App. 1986); Gay v.
Gay, 288 S.C. 74, 339 S.E.2d 532 (Ct. App. 1986); Allen v. Allen, 287 S.C. 501, 339 S.E.2d
872 (Ct. App. 1986); Barr v. Barr, 287 S.C. 13, 336 S.E.2d 481 (Ct. App. 1985); Hendricks
v. Hendricks, 285 S.C. 591, 330 S.E.2d 553 (Ct. App. 1985); McElrath v. Walker, 285 S.C.
439, 330 S.E.2d 313 (Ct. App. 1985); Barth v. Barth, 285 S.C. 316, 329 S.E.2d 446 (Ct.
App. 1985).
4. 284 S.C. at 73, 325 S.E.2d at 67. The valuation submitted to the trial judge by
both attorneys appears to be deficient. The trial judge evidently felt he was able to equi-
tably distribute the property despite this incredible range of values. Some examples are
as follows: Home, $100,000 to $225,000; furniture, $5000 to $85,000; grocery store,
$50,000 to $500,000; rental property, $125,000 to $150,000. Id. If the valuation had been
more precise, the amount finally awarded to the wife might have been vastly different. It
is important to note that improper valuation of marital property is a charge leveled
against domestic attorneys with increasing regularity in malpractice actions. See L.
GOLDEN, EQUITA3LE DISTRIBUTION OF PROPERTY § 1.10, at 13 (1983).
5. 284 S.C. at 73-74, 325 S.E.2d at 67.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 75, 325 S.E.2d at 68.
8. L. GOLDEN, supra note 4, § 8.12, at 254.
[Vol. 38
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DOMESTIC LAW
tion. Some factors are of statutory creation; others are of judicial
creation.9 The factors adopted by the South Carolina Supreme
Court in Shaluly are both typical and workable. The practi-
tioner should scrutinize each factor listed and persuade the
court to weigh those most relevant to his client more heavily.
Nancy S. Rights
B. Equitable Distribution Factors Applied
In Barr v. Barr0 the South Carolina Court of Appeals ap-
plied the factors set forth in Shaluly v. Shaluly" for equitable
distribution of marital property. The dispute arose over whether
a father's forgiveness of a $28,000 mortgage six years before di-
vorce was a gift to his son alone or a gift to both his son and his
daughter-in-law. Of the thirteen factors listed in Shaluly, the
court focused on the source of the acquisition.
1 2
Although the South Carolina Supreme Court in Shaluly did
not designate any one of the thirteen factors as more important
than the others, the emphasis by the court in Barr of the source
of acquisition is in accord with statutory and common law in
other jurisdictions. 3 By sole reference to the source of acquisi-
tion, the Barr court concluded that the trial judge was equitable
in considering the forgiveness of the debt a gift and in sub-
tracting that forgiven debt from the value of the marital home."'
This decision by the court left only $15,000 to be divided be-
tween the Barrs. In its emphasis, South Carolina joins the ma-
jority of jurisdictions that have held that equitable distribution
need not necessarily be equal. 5 In fact, three common-law states
have by statute created a rebuttable presumption in favor of an
equal split.'6 Even those states with the presumption in favor of
the equal split have found it easy to circumvent the presumption
9. See id. §§ 2.04, 2.05, at 22-24.
10. 287 S.C. 13, 336 S.E.2d 481 (Ct. App. 1985).
11. 284 S.C. 71, 325 S.E.2d 66 (1985).
12. 287 S.C. at 18, 336 S.E.2d at 483.
13. 284 S.C. at 71, 325 S.E.2d at 66.
14. 287 S.C. at 16-17, 336 S.E.2d at 484.
15. See L. GOLDEN, supra note 4, § 8.05, at 241.
16. See id.
1986]
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when circumstances called for doing so. 17
The dissent in Barr made a strong argument for not consid-
ering the forgiven mortgage as a gift to the husband alone. This
argument was based on several factual considerations: the home
was jointly owned, the father did not indicate any bifurcated in-
tent at the time he made the gift, and the forgiveness took place
six years before the divorce.' The Barr court's majority posi-
tion, however, is not clearly as suspect as the position taken in
the Montana case of In re Marriage of Herron.9 The cash gift in
Herron was jointly made, but the court overturned an equal
split of property acquired with that cash in favor of the natural
daughter of the donor. The court determined that the gift was
made by the father to "provide for his only daughter."20 The
Herron court focused on the source of the acquisition and went
so far as to reclassify a jointly made gift into a sole gift.
The practitioner might glean from Barr several guidelines
for use in a property division case. First, the attorney should
carefully analyze the factors listed in Shaluly.2' He should em-
phasize factors such as age, health, needed support for an eco-
nomically dependent spouse, and facts that are particularly rele-
vant to his client. In addition, because the contribution factor is
accorded great weight by the court, the practitioner should ar-
gue his client's contribution to the best advantage. This may re-
quire expert witnesses such as financial analysts and tax consul-
tants who can interpret the facts to the client's advantage.
Nancy S. Rights
C. Contributing Spouse Has Equitable Interest
In Bannen v. Bannen22 the South Carolina Court of Appeals
held that Dr. Bannen's interest in a professional association
should have been considered in valuing the marital estate for the
17. See id.
18. 287 S.C. at 18-19, 336 S.E.2d at 485 (Shaw, J., dissenting).
19. 186 Mont. 396, 608 P.2d 97 (1980)(cited in Barr, 287 S.C. at 18, 336 S.E.2d at
485).
20. Id. at 402, 608 P.2d at 100. See L. GOLDEN, supra note 4, § 8.09, at 250-51 nn.85-
89.
21. 284 S.C. at 75, 325 S.E.2d at 68.
22. 286 S.C. 24, 331 S.E.2d 379 (Ct. App. 1985).
[Vol. 38
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purpose of making an equitable division of the estate upon di-
vorce." The court of appeals found that because South Carolina
statutory law prohibited Mrs. Bannen from acquiring any pos-
sessory interest in the professional association,24 she was entitled
to a distributive award equivalent to her equity in the profes-
sional association from other assets of the marital estate.2 5
In one sense this decision is unexceptional since it is consis-
tent with South Carolina precedent. The contrary decision, how-
ever, that a spouse's interest in a professional association should
be excluded when valuing the marital estate, would have created
an anomaly in South Carolina equitable distribution law by per-
mitting the nature of a spouse's assets to determine the other
spouse's right to an equitable division of those assets. After Ban-
nen it is clear that the dispositive question on the issue of a
spouse's right to equitable distribution remains focused on the
materiality of the spouse's contributions to the marriage and not
on the nature of the marital assets.
Dr. and Mrs. Bannen were married in 1952. From 1954 until
1980, Dr. Bannen's medical practice was in the form of a part-
nership. In 1954 Dr. Bannen and his partners acquired an office
building and its accompanying real estate for use in the practice.
After one of Dr. Bannen's two partners retired, Dr. Bannen's in-
terest in this property was fifty percent of its value.2" From the
partnership's inception, Mrs. Bannen worked for the partnership
as an unpaid, part-time receptionist, treasurer, bookkeeper, and
secretary. In addition to these duties, Mrs. Bannen raised the
Bannen's three children and maintained the marital home.2 7 In
23. Id. at 28, 331 S.E.2d at 381.
24. S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-51-100 (1976) states as follows: "A professional association
may . . . accept as members of the professional association . . . only persons who are
duly licensed or otherwise legally authorized to render the same professional service as
that for which the professional association was organized." Thus, Mrs. Bannen, who was
not a doctor, could not receive any legal or equitable interest in Dr. Bannen's profes-
sional association.
25. 286 S.C. at 28, 331 S.E.2d at 381.
26. Mrs. Bannen's expert witness valued the medical building and accompanying
real estate at $275,000. Record at 36. Dr. Bannen's testimony was that the building and
land were insured for $305,000. Dr. Bannen also testified that these assets were subject
to a $65,000 mortgage. Therefore, according to Dr. Bannen's testimony, his 50% interest
in these assets had a value of $120,000. Record at 133-34.
27. The trial judge found that "Mrs. Bannen did not work regularly during the mar-
riage . . . that she did help on some occasions in Dr. Bannen's office, but that most of
her efforts were devoted to being a housewife and mother." Record at 15.
1986]
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1980 Dr. Bannen and his partner changed the status of their
business from a partnership to a professional association. A few
months later, just seven months prior to leaving the marital
home, Dr. Bannen conveyed his fifty percent interest in the of-
fice building and the real estate to the professional association
for the consideration of one dollar. In 1982 the Bannens were
divorced on the ground of one year's continuous separation.
The trial court awarded Mrs. Bannen monthly alimony and
attorney's fees. Additionally, the court found that Mrs. Bannen
was entitled to an equitable division of the marital estate be-
cause she had been a good mother and had maintained e proper
home.2 8 The trial court, however, explicitly rejected Mrs. Ban-
nen's contention that Dr. Bannen's interest in the professional
association was marital property that should be included in val-
uing the estate.29 Consequently, the equitable award to Mrs.
Bannen did not reflect the value of this asset. Mrs. Barmen ap-
pealed and the court of appeals reversed.30
In reversing, the court of appeals noted that Mrs. Bannen's
many years of service to the partnership entitled her to a "spe-
cial equity" 31 in her husband's medical practice. Thus, while the
28. Assets considered by the trial judge as marital property were the following: The
marital home, valued between $140,000 and $150,000, owned by Dr. and Mrs. Bannen as
tenant3 in common; a 133-acre lot, valued between $78,000 and $82,460, owned by Mrs.
Bannen; a lot in Powderhorn, valued at $40,000 with title held under a joint tenancy; a
lot in Conestee valued at $500 and also held under a joint tenancy. Record at 16-17. All
of this property was purchased with funds supplied by Dr. Barmen. He made a gift of the
133-acre lot to Mrs. Bannen and designated Mrs. Bannen as a tenant in common or joint
tenant in the other properties. The trial court's award gave Mrs. Barmen the home, sub-
ject to the existing mortgages, and Dr. Barmen acquired whole ownership over the other
properties. Id.
29. Record at 17.
30. Mrs. Bannen also appealed the trial court's refusal to allow her to testify on the
value of the medical building and the real estate on which the building was located, and
the amount of alimony awarded by the trial court. The court of appeals reversed on the
first ground. It held that Mrs. Barmen had sufficient knowledge of the value of the busi-
ness property. Because she had signed the mortgage when the office was first built and
had worked in the office for 16 years, the court concluded that her opinion was removed
from "the realm of mere conjecture." 286 S.C. at 28, 331 S.E.2d at 382 (quoting City of
Spartanburg v. Laprinakos, 267 S.C. 589, 230 S.E.2d 443 (1976)). The court of appeals
affirmed the alimony award since there was n indication that the trial court had clearly
abused its discretion. Id. at 29, 331 S.E.2d at 382.
31. It appears that the term "special equity" is used synonymously with "equitable
interest" by South Carolina courts. In Bannen the court of appeals used the term "spe-
cial equity"; however, in Reid v. Reid, 280 S.C. 367, 312 S.E.2d 724 (Ct. App. 1984),
which presented facts similar to Bannen, the court used the term "equitable interest."
6
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practice remained a partnership, Dr. Bannen's interest in the of-
fice building and the accompanying real estate would have been
considered in valuing the marital estate.3 2 Stating that "[iut
would be inequitable to permit a change in the form of owner-
ship of the medical practice to erase her contributions to its de-
velopment or to destroy her right to have the value of those con-
tributions considered in dividing the marital estate, 33 the court
rejected a policy that would treat assets in a professional associ-
ation differently from assets in a partnership. Therefore, the
court held that the value of Dr. Bannen's interest in the profes-
sional association should have been considered in valuing the es-
tate. Instead of giving Mrs. Bannen an interest in the profes-
sional association, the court concluded that a distributive award
reflecting her equity in the association should be made from
other marital assets. 34
A spouse's right to an equitable division of the marital es-
tate upon divorce is firmly established in South Carolina.35 This
right arises when the spouse materially contributes to the acqui-
Additionally, the Reid court, in citing Wilson v. Wilson, 270 S.C. 216, 241 S.E.2d 566
(1978), changed the Wilson court's use of "special equity" into "equitable interest." In
Parrott v. Parrott, 278 S.C. 60, 292 S.E.2d 182 (1982), the supreme court, citing Wilson,
stated that a "special equity or equitable interest could be found." Id. at 62, 292 S.E.2d
at 183. Later in the opinion, however, the Parrott court specifically distinguished the
terms. The court found that a "special equity" award would be inadequate to compen-
sate Mrs. Parrott and held that the homemaker was entitled to an "equitable interest" in
real property acquired during the marriage. Id. at 63, 292 S.E.2d at 183-84. See generally
Chastain, Henry, & Woodside, Determination of Property Rights'Upon Divorce in
South Carolina: An Exploration and Recommendation, 33 S.C.L. RE V. 227 (1981)[herein-
after Chastain]. For the purpose of this article, the terms are used interchangeably.
32. 286 S.C. at 27, 331 S.E.2d at 381.
33. Id. at 27-28, 331 S.E.2d at 381.
34. Id.
35. For an analysis of the development of equitable distribution in South Carolina,
see Chastain, supra note 31, at 240-41. In Wilson v. Wilson, 270 S.C. 216, 241 S.E.2d 566
(1978), the seminal case on equitable distribution in South Carolina, the supreme court
held that a wife can acquire a special equity in property "[wihere a wife has made a
material contribution to the husband's acquisition of property .... ." Id. at 221, 241
S.E.2d at 568 (quoting 27B C.J.S. Divorce § 293 (1959)). The supreme court has a liberal
view of this requirement. For example, it has recognized that the contributions of a
homemaker who has provided for the family home for 20 years, but has not contributed
any finances are sufficient to give rise to an equitable interest in property acquired dur-
ing the marriage. Parrott, 278 S.C. at 60, 292 S.E.2d at 182. Moreover, it is not necessary
that the contribution be rendered toward the acquisition of a particular piece of property
to acquire an equitable interest in it. Baker v. Baker, 276 S.C. 427, 279 S.E.2d 601
(1981); Reid v. Reid, 280 S.C. 367, 312 S.E.2d 724 (Ct. App. 1984).
7
Rights et al.: Domestic Law
Published by Scholar Commons,
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
sition of property acquired during the marriage. It is also well
established that a spouse's business interests are marital prop-
erty that can be considered in equitably dividing a marital es-
tate. 8 The only novel issue presented by Bannen, then, was
whether a spouse, who otherwise was entitled to an equitable
division of the marital estate, had a right to have property in
which the spouse could not legally acquire an interest considered
in valuing the estate.
In holding that assets in a professional association should be
considered in valuing the marital estate even though one spouse
could not own an interest in the professional association, the
court of appeals aligned South Carolina with other states that
have considered this issue.37 Additionally, the court's decision is
proper since its implicit meaning is that the focus of South Car-
olina courts in determining a spouse's equitable interest in mari-
tal property remains exclusively on the materiality of the
spouse's contribution to the acquisition of property during mar-
riage. This inquiry reflects the analysis consistently applied by
the South Carolina Supreme Court.3 8
The focus of the inquiry should be limited to the materiality
of the spouse's contributions because an analysis that considers
the nature of the assets in dispute can lead to inequitable conse-
quences. First, assets could be insulated from a court's consider-
ation by purposefully converting them into property in which
36. Poniatowski v. Poniatowski, 275 S.C. 11, 266 S.E.2d 787 (1980); Reid v. Reid,
280 S.C. 367, 312 S.E.2d 724 (Ct. App. 1984); see also Tucker v. Tucker, 282 S.C. 261,
317 S.E.2d 764 (Ct. App. 1984).
It is noteworthy that Mrs. Reid and Mrs. Barmen rendered similar services to their
husbands' businesses. The only fact distinguishing Reid from Bannen was that Mr.
Reid's business was not of a nature that ownership in it was restricted by law and that
Dr. Barmen's business was of that nature. Compare Reid, 280 S.C. at 376-77, 312 S.E.2d
at 729, with Bannen, 286 S.C. at 27, 331 S.E.2d at 381.
37. See Bachman v. Bachman, 274 Ark. 23, 621 S.W.2d 701 (1981); Poore v. Poore,
75 N.C. App. 414, 331 S.E.2d 266 (1985); see also Litman v. Litman, 93 A.D.2d 695, 463
N.Y.S.2d 24 (1983), aff'd, 61 N.Y.2d 918, 463 N.E.2d 34, 474 N.Y.S.2d 718 (1984)(pursu-
ant to statute, court can make distributive award of law practice when distribution of
interest would be contrary to law); cf. Rostel v. Rostel, 622 P.2d 429 (Alaska 1981)(assets
in closed corporation are marital property to be considered in valuing the estate); War-
ren v. Warren, 12 Ark. App. 260, 675 S.W.2d 371 (1984)(although Uniform Partnership
Act precluded wife from acquiring an ownership interest in husband's partnership, court
held that asset should be valued and distributive award made); Wahl v. Wahl, 39 Wis. 2d
510, 159 N.W.2d 651 (1968), rev'd on other grounds, O'Conner v. O'Conner, 48 Wis. 2d
535, 180 N.W.2d 735 (1970)(assets in closed corporation considered marital property).
38. See Wilson v. Wilson, 270 S.C. 216, 241 S.E.2d 566 (1978).
[Vol. 38
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one spouse is barred from acquiring any interest. The result
would be that a spouse's right to receive an equitable share in
property upon dissolution of the marriage would be destroyed by
investment practices designed to exploit peculiarities in the law.
Second, two spouses who have contributed equally to their re-
spective marriages, equally deserve to receive some share of the
marital property upon divorce. The spouses, however, could be
treated differently simply because one spouse's mate owns assets
in a business that the law states can be owned only by a particu-
lar class of persons. Therefore, the principles of stare decisis and
fairness support the Bannen decision.
The court of appeals held that a distributive award reflect-
ing the value of Mrs. Bannen's equity in the professional associ-
ation should be made from other assets of the marital estate.3 9
This method of shaping relief is consistent with the South Caro-
lina rule that the trial judge is permitted broad discretion in
shaping equitable relief for divorcing parties.40 Frequently, trial
courts have chosen to divide business assets by giving complete
ownership of those assets to one spouse while the other spouse is
compensated with assets from other property of the marital es-
tate.41 The policy supporting this type of property division is
that co-ownership creates the potential for continuing discord
between parties who are already bitter. Moreover, distributive
awards make it easier to consider business assets in valuing the
marital estate. These awards provide for compensation to de-
serving spouses for their equitable interest in business property
while allowing the business to remain intact. For this reason,
distributive awards are commonly implemented in many
jurisdictions.43
Bannen underscores the policy that a spouse who materially
contributes to the acquisition of property during marriage devel-
39. 286 S.C. at 28, 331 S.E.2d at 381.
40. See Chastain, supra note 31, at 246-47.
41. See, e.g., Reid v. Reid, 280 S.C. 367, 376-77, 312 S.E.2d 724, 729 (Ct. App. 1984);
see also Moyle v. Moyle, 262 S.C. 308, 204 S.E.2d 46 (1974)(lump sum award made to the
wife rather than divide husband's one-half interest in a medical office building); Tucker
v. Tucker, 282 S.C. 261, 265, 317 S.E.2d 764, 767 (Ct. App. 1984)(court remanded to trial
court for determination of "the issue of whether and to what extent the wife is entitled
to an equitable interest in the husband's business or to a greater equitable interest in the
marital home").
42. See, e.g., Bowen v. Bowen, 96 N.J. 36, 473 A.2d 73 (1984).
43. See L. GOLDEN, EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION OF PROPERTY § 8.07, at 245 (1983).
1986]
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ops an equitable interest in the property that should be compen-
sated upon divorce. The significance of Bannen is that it indi-
cates that the value of a spouse's equitable interest depends only
upon the materiality of the spouse's contributions. The nature of
the disputed assets does not enter into this calculation. Con-
strued liberally, Bannen could mean that no asset is beyond
consideration if the spouse has earned an equitable interest in
the marital assets because a distributive award reflecting the
spouse's special equity can be made. Nevertheless, questions
concerning the valuation of assets held in businesses such as
professional associations remain unanswered.44 This clearly will
be a pressing issue for South Carolina courts in the near future.
Michael D. Hill
II, REHABILITATIVE ALIMONY EXPRESSLY RECOGNIZED
In Herring v. Herring"5 the South Carolina Supreme Court
expressly approved the use of rehabilitative alimony awards in
divorce actions in which the dependent spouse has the ability to
become self-sufficient.4 The court adopted the concept of reha-
bilitative alimony described by the New Jersey Supreme Court
in Turner v. Turner47 and accepted by the South Carolina Court
of Appeals in Eagerton v. Eagerton,4 but cautioned that such
awards "are valid only when established by evidence sufficient to
support their temporary nature. '49 With the decisions in Her-
ring and Eagerton, South Carolina joins those states which have
recognized the changing role of women in today's society and
their increasing opportunity for self-support.50
44. In Reid the court stated that the value of business assets for the purpose of
equitable distribution is "the fair market value of the corporate property as an estab-
lished and going business." Reid, 280 S.C. at 373, 312 S.E.2d at 727 (quoting Santee Oil
Co. v. Cox, 265 S.C. 270, 217 S.E.2d 789 (1975)). It is unclear, however, whether South
Carolina will permit intangible assets such as good will to be included in calculating fair
market value.
45. 286 S.C. 447, 335 S.E.2d 366 (1985).
46. Id. at 451, 335 S.E.2d at 368.
47. 158 N.J. Super. 313, 385 A.2d 1280 (Ch. Div. 1978).
48. 285 S.C. 279, 328 S.E.2d 912 (Ct. App. 1985).
49. 286 S.C. at 451, 335 S.E.2d at 368.
50. A number of jurisdictions by statute now allow trial courts to award rehabilita-
tive alimony by permitting them to consider the employment potential of a dependent
[Vol. 38
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The Herrings were married in 1957 and reared three chil-
dren, two of whom were emancipated. The third child was eight
years old at the time of the family court hearings.51 The Her-
rings separated in June 1982, and the wife subsequently filed for
a divorce on grounds of adultery. The trial judge granted the
divorce and awarded the wife thirty percent of the family's real
property as an equitable distribution, but denied her request for
possession of the family residence.5 2 He also ordered the hus-
band to pay alimony, child support, and the wife's attorney's
fees.5 The trial judge awarded Mrs. Herring alimony of $350 per
month for a period of three years, describing the duration of the
award as "a rehabilitative period of time. ' 54 He reasoned that
the wife would be capable of performing "more remunerative
employment" within three years.55
On appeal the supreme court addressed the concept of reha-
bilitative alimony, but held that in this particular case the rec-
ord failed to demonstrate that the wife would be self-supportive
at the expiration date of the ordered payments.56 The court em-
spouse along with other factors such as the financial resources of the parties. See, e.g.,
ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-319 (1976); CAL. CIv. CODE § 4801 (West Supp. 1984); COLO.
REV. STAT. § 14-10-114 (Supp. 1985); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-82 (West Supp. 1982);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 1512(c) (1981); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.08 (West 1982); HAWAII
REv. STAT. § 580-47 (Supp. 1982); IDAHO CODE § 32-705 (1983); Ky. REV. STAT. § 598.21(3)
(West 1981 & Supp. 1982); Ky. REV. STAT. § 403.200 (1982); MD. ANN. CODE art. 16, § 1
(1981); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-203 (1985); OR REV. STAT. § 107.105(1)(c) (1984); see
also UNIF. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT § 308, 9A U.LA 307 (1979). Other jurisdictions
have interpreted general statutes providing for alimony awards to confer broad discre-
tion upon a court to recognize rehabilitative alimony. See, e.g., Bussel v. Bussell, 623
P.2d 1221 (Alaska 1981); Grinold v. Grinold, 32 Conn. Supp. 225, 348 A.2d 32 (Super. Ct.
1975); Kahn v. Kahn, 78 So. 2d 367 (Fla. 1955); Johnson v. Steel, Inc., 94 Nev. 483, 581
P.2d 860 (1978); Turner v. Turner, 158 N.J. Super. 313, 385 A.2d 1280 (Ch. Div. 1978);
Smith v. Smith, 326 N.W.2d 697 (N.D. 1982); Martin v. Martin, 358 N.W.2d 793 (S.D.
1984); Warren v. Warren, 655 P.2d 684 (Utah 1982); Endres v. Endres, 62 Wash. 2d 55,
380 P.2d 873 (1963); Molnar v. Molnar, 314 S.E.2d 73 (W. Va. 1984); Canty v. Canty, 87
Wis. 2d 759, 275 N.W.2d 888 (1979).
51. 286 S.C. at 448-49, 335 S.E.2d at 367.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 450, 335 S.E.2d at 368. The trial court stated that child support payments
should be increased at the end of three years when the alimony payments cease. The
supreme court reversed this order, holding that "automatic increases in child support at
a designated future date are invalid." Id. at 452-53, 335 S.E.2d at 369. Such increases
must be based upon evidentiary findings showing a change of condition. Id.
54. Record at 132.
55. Id.
56. 286 S.C. at 451, 335 S.E.2d at 368.
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phasized that "the peril inherent in rehabilitative alimony is its
contingency that the recipient will achieve self-sufficiency within
the proscribed period. ' 57 In Herring the wife was forty-six years
old and had no savings, no secretarial or industrial training, and
no real work experience. Since these facts indicated that the wife
would not become self-supporting, the court held that the ali-
mony payments should continue indefinitely.5 8 It was made clear
that, after three years, Mr. Herring could petition the family
court to terminate or reduce the alimony payments.5 9
Rehabilitative alimony is "alimony payable for a short, but
specific and terminable period of time, which will cease when
the recipient is, in the exercise of reasonable efforts, in a posi-
tion of self support."60 The time limitation provides the support-
ing spouse with a degree of certainty of the nature and extent of
his or her obligation to the dependent spouse and alleviates the
post-divorce recourse to the courts.621 In addition, rehabilitative
alimony generally considers the future and past condition of
both parties to a divorce.6 2 It is based on the premise that the
dependent spouse has a potential for self-support, but needs en-
couragement and time to develop that potential.6 3 The alimony
is often awarded in an amount and duration sufficient to give
the dependent spouse an opportunity to develop new employ-
ment skills or enhance old ones, allowing a dependent spouse
time to return to school, establish a new career, or simply adapt
to being self-supportive.6 '
As emphasized in Herring, however, rehabilitative alimony
is only proper when the dependent spouse is capable of becom-
ing self-supporting.6 5 Rehabilitative alimony is generally consid-
57. Id. at 452, 335 S.E.2d at 369.
58. Id. at 453, 335 S.E.2d at 369.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 450, 335 S.E.2d at 368 (quoting Turner v. Turner, 158 N.J. Super. 313,
314, 385 A.2d 1280, 1281 (Ch. Div. 1978)).
61. Turner, 158 N.J. Super. at 315, 385 A.2d at 1281.
62. Annotation, Propriety in Divorce Proceedings of Awarding Rehabilitative Ali-
mony, 97 A.L.R.3D 740, 743 (1980).
63. Turner, 158 N.J. Super. at 317, 385 A.2d at 1282.
64. 286 S.C. at 451, 335 S.E.2d at 368.
65. Id.; see also Ruszala v. Ruszala, 360 So. 2d 1288, 1289 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
One commentator states, "If, after a dissolution, a spouse is incapable of self-support or
too old or unable to be retrained, that spouse is entitled to an award of permanent ali-
mony." Comment, Rehabilitative Alimony - A Matter of Discretion or Direction?, 12
FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 285, 290 (1984). In Eagerton v. Eagerton, 285 S.C. 279, 328 S.E.2d 912
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ered most appropriate where the dependent spouse is still
young, the marriage was of a relatively short duration, and the
dependent spouse exhibits a potential for becoming self-suffi-
cient. 6 Accordingly, the court in Eagerton emphasized that re-
habilitative alimony will rarely be approved when "a spouse has
been out of the job market performing spousal duties over the
course of a lengthy marriage. ' s7 The court of appeals indicated,
however, that a proper consideration for an alimony award
would be the other responsibilities of the supported spouse such
as care for children of the marriage, which would interfere with
the retraining.""
Since rehabilitative alimony is awarded for a limited time,
the amount awarded might be greater than would have been
awarded as permanent alimony. 9 Under the Eagerton standard,
the costs and time necessary to complete training should be con-
sidered in determining the amount and duration of the award.70
A court may also award permanent alimony along with rehabili-
tative alimony if it concludes that the dependent spouse will be
capable of producing some income after training, but not enough
to maintain her accustomed standard of living. 1
Under rehabilitative alimony the dependent spouse's allow-
(Ct. App. 1985), the court of appeals listed eight factors that should be considered in
awarding rehabilitative alimony as follows:
(1)[T]he duration of the marriage; (2) the age, health, and educational
back[g]round of the supported spouse, (3) the financial resources of the par-
ties, (4) the parties' accustomed standards of living, (5) the ability of the
spouse from whom maintenance is sought to meet his needs while meeting
those of the spouse seeking maintenance, (6) the time necessary for the depen-
dent spouse to acquire job skills, (7) the likelihood that the spouse will success-
fully complete retraining and (8) the likelihood of success in the job market.
Id. at 283, 328 S.E.2d at 915.
66. Molnar v. Molnar, 314 S.E.2d 73 (W. Va. 1984).
67. 285 S.C. at 284, 328 S.E.2d at 915.
68. Id. at 283, 328 S.E.2d at 915. Some courts have considered the existence of chil-
dren a major factor not only in determining whether rehabilitative alimony should be
awarded, but also in measuring the amount and duration of any such award. See Moses
v. Moses, 344 So. 2d 1322 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977); Ruhnau v. Ruhnau, 299 So. 2d 61
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974). The wife's desire to stay in the home to care for her young
children has also been given considerable weight. King v. King, 316 So. 2d 322, 323 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1975). Other courts, however, have rejected the proposition that an other-
wise rehabilitative wife may choose to forego rehabilitation in order to remain at home to
care for her children. See, e.g., Kuvin v. Kuvin, 442 So. 2d 203 (Fla. 1983).
69. Turner, 158 N.J. Super. at 318, 385 A.2d at 1282.
70. See 285 S.C. at 282-83, 328 S.E.2d at 915.
71. Luff v. Luff, 329 S.E.2d 100 (W. Va. 1985).
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ance is terminated at some predetermined time. A failure by the
spouse to become self-supporting by this date, however, may
mandate such a change in circumstances that the court will
modify the alimony award by making it permanent or by ex-
tending the time period of the rehabilitative award.
72
In holding that the award of rehabilitative alimony is proper
in certain circumstances, the supreme court in Herring recog-
nized that income-earning potential is not limited to the sup-
porting spouse. If used properly, rehabilitative alimony can re-
lieve a supporting spouse of an unnecessary burden and provide
an incentive to the dependent spouse to become self-supporting.
Neil E. Grayson
III. CHILD CUSTODY WHERE ADULTEROUS BEHAVIOR IS
CONCERNED
In all controversies between parents over custody of their
children, the primary consideration of the court is the welfare of
the children.7 3 In Wilson v. Wilson' the South Carolina Su-
preme Court awarded custody of a child to his father, basing its
decision primarily on the mother's adulterous behavior. The
court held that the morality of a parent affects that parent's fit-
ness to raise the child and is a proper factor in considering child
custody.75 The court's decision is in accord with the general rule
established in South Carolina, 7 but it emphasizes that when the
adulterous spouse's behavior is indicative of a continued course
of conduct, the court will apparently presume the adulterous ac-
tivity has an adverse effect on the child and is not in the child's
best interest.
77
72. Id.
73. S.C. CODE ANN. § 21-21-10 (Supp. 1985); see also Cole v. Cole, 274 S.C. 449, 265
S.E.2d 669 (1980); Ford v. Ford, 242 S.C. 344, 130 S.E.2d 916 (1963); Koon v. Koon, 203
S.C. 556, 28 S.E.2d 89 (1943).
74. 285 S.C. 481, 330 S.E.2d 303 (1985).
75. Id. at 482, 330 S.E.2d at 304.
76. Cole v. Cole, 274 S.C. 449, 265 S.E.2d 669 (1980); Davenport v. Davenport, 265
S.C. 524, 220 S.E.2d 228 (1975); Marshall v. Marshall, 282 S.C. 534, 320 S.E.2d 44 (Ct.
App. 1984).
77. This does not, however, mean that the "innocent" spouse will always be awarded
custody of the child. The adultery may be outweighed by other factors which tend to
show what is in the best interests of the child. See Cole, 274 S.C. at 454-55, 265 S.E.2d at
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The Wilsons were married in 1978 and had their only child,
a son, later in that same year. 8 When the couple separated in
1981, the wife was awarded temporary custody of the child. Af-
ter the separation, Mr. Wilson became suspicious that his wife
was seeing another man and subsequently filed for a divorce.
Mr. Wilson introduced evidence at the divorce proceedings that
his wife had openly entered into a relationship with another
man.
9
In 1983 the family court granted Mr. Wilson a divorce on
the grounds of adultery and awarded him permanent custody of
their child. The family court order stated that the custody
award was based on the best interests and welfare of the child.
The family court also listed several factors it had considered in
making the award: the conduct of each parent;"0 each parent's
love for the child; the child's love for each parent; the husband's
capability of providing for the child both morally and materially;
and the wife's immoral conduct in committing adultery.81 Mrs.
Wilson did not appeal the grant of divorce.8 2 Nevertheless, she
appealed the custody award, alleging that the family court based
its decision on her immorality rather than on the best interests
of the child.8
It is well established in South Carolina that the custody of a
child should be determined by considering the child's welfare
and best interests.8 4 In determining which parent can best pro-
671. See generally Lauerman, Nonmarital Sexual Conduct and Child Custody, 46 U.
CIN. L. REv. 647, 654-81 (1977). Professor Lauerman explains that courts usually use one
of four approaches in evaluating the effect of a parent's adulterous activities on the child:
the adulterous or illicit activity may conclusively disqualify the parent from taking cus-
tody; it may cause a parent to be presumed unfit to take custody; the court may presume
the activity has an adverse impact on the child; or the court may require a direct adverse
impact to be shown on the child. Id. South Carolina seems to follow the third approach:
a presumption that the adultery has an adverse impact on the child.
78. Record at 8.
79. Brief of Respondent at 4.
80. Record at 10. The trial court evaluated the conduct of the parents "to determine
if conduct tolerated in the presence of such child would be conduct tolerated by a caring
society." Id.
81. Record at 12-13.
82. Thus, the divorce became the law of the case. See Johnson v. Johnson, 251 S.C.
420, 163 S.E.2d 229 (1968). In his dissent in Wilson, however, Justice Gregory proposed
to reverse the grant of divorce. 285 S.C. at 483-84, 330 S.E.2d at 304-05 (Gregory, J.,
dissenting).
83. Record at 146.
84. S.C. CODE ANN. § 21-21-10 (Supp. 1985); see also Cole v. Cole, 274 S.C. 449, 265
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vide for the welfare of the child, the court should consider all
the circumstances and factors of the case.85 One court addressing
this issue stated that "[tihe morality of a parent is a proper fac-
tor for consideration but is limited in its force to what relevancy
it has, either directly or indirectly, to the welfare of the child.
Custody of a child is not granted a party as a reward or withheld
as a punishment." 8
South Carolina courts previously have held that when one
spouse enters into a continuing adulterous relationship, it is not
in the child's best interests for that parent to have custody. 7 On
the other hand, when the adulterous spouse's behavior is "not
indicative of a continued course of conduct" and the spouse is
"repentant and remorseful," the court will usually give little
weight to that spouse's "moral lapses" in determining custody.8
Wilson follows this general rule. The court apparently presumed
that the continuing relationship between Mrs. Wilson and her
paramour was against the child's best interests and, thus, a
proper factor for consideration. 9
Mrs. Wilson asserted that the court should apply the tender
years doctrine and award her custody of the child.90 This doc-
trine places emphasis on the age, health, and gender of the chil-
dren and gives preference to the mother for custody of particu-
larly young or unhealthy children.9 1 The tender years doctrine,
however, does not mandate maternal custody; it is merely a fac-
tor to be considered along with all the other evidence.92
S.E.2d 669 (1980).
85. Johnson, 251 S.C. at 426, 163 S.E.2d at 232; Ford v. Ford, 242 S.C. 344, 130
S.E.2d 916 (1963).
86. Davenport v. Davenport, 265 S.C. 524, 527, 220 S.E.2d 228, 230 (1975).
87. Johnson v. Johnson, 251 S.C. 420, 163 S.E.2d 229 (1968).
88. Davenport, 265 S.C. at 528, 220 S.E.2d at 231; see also Bonnette v. Bonnette,
276 S.C. 653, 281 S.E.2d 790 (1981); Linder v. Agnew, 276 S.C. 153, 276 S.E.2d 774
(1981); Cole v. Cole, 274 S.C. 449, 265 S.E.2d 669 (1980); Dent v. Dent, 273 S.C. 387, 256
S.E.2d 743 (1979); Stutz v. Funderburk, 272 S.C. 273, 252 S.E.2d 32 (1979); Marshall v.
Marshall, 282 S.C. 534, 320 S.E.2d 44 (Ct. App. 1984).
89. 285 S.C. at 482, 330 S.E.2d at 304. The family court's order concluded that
"[h]er conduct is not only reprehensible, but is against the best interests and welfare of
the child." Record at 12.
90. Brief of Appellant at 11.
91. Ford v. Ford, 242 S.C. 344, 352, 130 S.E.2d 916, 921 (1963).
92. Marshall v. Marshall, 282 S.C. 534, 540, 320 S.E.2d 44, 48 (Ct. App. 1984)(citing
Green v. Loveday, 270 S.C. 410, 242 S.E.2d 441 (1978)).
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In Ford v. Ford93 the South Carolina Supreme Court enun-
ciated a number of factors to consider in determining what is in
the best interests of the child. Along with the morality of the
parent and the tender years doctrine, a court should consider
"the residence, surroundings and opportunities afforded in the
respective environments; the conduct and suitability of parents;
the preference in favor of the innocent or prevailing party; the
financial condition of the parents; agreements between parties,
and others. '94 A court may also consider actual possession of the
child95 and the child's preference 96 in determining custody. In
addition, the Ford court deferred to the opinion of the family
court judge, who was in a better position to observe the wit-
nesses and evaluate the veracity of their testimony.97
In Wilson the family court explicitly considered several of
these factors, but placed its emphasis on the same factor that
the parties emphasized at trial and in their briefs: the adulterous
conduct of Mrs. Wilson. The adulterous conduct indicated that
the child's best interests would not be served by an award of
custody to Mrs. Wilson. In the absence of any other significant
factors or circumstances that could have affected the welfare of
the child, the court's decision appears to reaffirm established
South Carolina law.
Neil E. Grayson
IV. ENFORCEMENT OF A PREVIOUS VOLUNTARY CONSENT TO
ADOPTION
The question whether a natural mother who has consented
to the adoption of her child may withdraw such consent is
closely governed by statute. 8 According to the statutory law of
South Carolina, absent vitiating factors such as fraud, duress,
undue influence, or mistake, the essential concern is whether the
withdrawal of consent would be consistent with the best inter-
93. 242 S.C. 344, 130 S.E.2d 916 (1963).
94. Id. at 352, 130 S.E.2d at 921 (citing 27B C.J.S. Divorce § 309(1) (1959)).
95. Id.
96. Smith v. Smith, 261 S.C. 81, 85-86, 198 S.E.2d 271, 274 (1973).
97. 285 S.C. at 483, 330 S.E.2d at 304.
98. See Driggers v. Jolley, 219 S.C. 31, 64 S.E.2d 19 (1951).
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ests of the child."e In considering these interests, South Carolina
courts and courts of other jurisdictions weigh such factors as the
natural mother's age, personality, financial status, and the home
environment that she could provide against the comparative ad-
vantages that the adoptive parents might provide. 00 In addition,
courts often give significant consideration to the stage at which
the action to withdraw consent is brought.'0 '
In Phillips v. Bakerl0 2 the South Carolina Supreme Court
held that the mother's consent to her child's adoption was vol-
untarily given and that the child's interests would be best served
by denying withdrawal of that consent. 03 Lisa Phillips, an un-
married, sixteen-year-old female, gave birth to a baby girl, Sa-
rah, on January 25, 1982. At the time of Sarah's birth, Phillips
was unable to locate the father of her child and was living at
home with her parents. On January 26 Phillips executed a con-
sent to adoption form.104 On the following day the Bakers took
sole custody of Sarah, and on February 2 they filed a petition to
adopt the baby. One week later, Phillips filed a petition to with-
draw her consent. 0 5 In May 1982 the family court issued an or-
der denying Phillips' petition. On appeal the South Carolina Su-
preme Court affirmed, finding that the preponderance of the
evidence supported the lower court ruling. 0 6
In cases involving the adoption of children, the question
whether the proposed adoption would serve the best interests of
99. South Carolina Code § 20-7-1720 provides:
Withdrawal of any consent, filed in connection with a petition for adoption
hereunder, shall not be permitted except by order of the court after notice and
opportunity to be heard is given to all parties concerned. If it finds that the
best interest of the child will be furthered thereby, the court may issue a writ-
ten order permitting the withdrawal of such consent. The entry of the interloc-
utory or final decree of adoption renders any consent irrevocable.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-1720 (1976).
100. See, e.g., Williams v. Pope, 281 Ala. 416, 203 So. 2d 271, appeal after demand,
284 Ala. 456, 225 So. 2d 861 (1967); Graves v. Graves, 51 Ala. App. 601, 288 So. 2d 142
(1973); In re D., 408 S.W.2d 361 (Mo. Ct. App. 1966); People ex rel. Scarpetta v. Spence-
Chapin Adoption Serv., 28 N.Y.2d 185, 269 N.E.2d 787, appeal dismissed and cert. de-
nied, 404 U.S. 805 (1971).
101. Ellison v. Camby, 269 S.C. 48, 236 S.E.2d 197 (1977); Driggers v. Jolley, 219
S.C. 31, 64 S.E.2d 19 (1951).
102. 284 S.C. 134, 325 S.E.2d 533 (1985).
103. Id. at 136-37, 325 S.E.2d at 534-35.
104. Id. at 135, 325 S.E.2d at 534.
105. Id. at 136, 325 S.E.2d at 534.
106. Id., 325 S.E.2d at 535.
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the child is usually not reached until it has first been deter-
mined that the consent of the biological parent has been either
attained or is unnecessary. 107 If consent has been attained or is
unnecessary, the issue becomes whether the consent is valid. In
determining whether the mother's consent was valid, the Phil-
lips court examined the circumstances of the consent for indicia
of duress. 05 Phillips argued that the combined factors of the
physical exhaustion of a lengthy labor; the normal medications
involved with pain; and the pressure from her father, her attor-
ney, and a social worker prevented her consent from being
valid. 09
The adoptive parents countered Phillips' argument with ev-
idence that her consent had not been obtained under circum-
stances that would invalidate her consent. The adoptive parents
referred to the young woman's rebellious personality as evidence
of a strong will and to the fact that her lawyer and a social
worker had both advised her of her rights under the circum-
stances.110 The supreme court ruled that the evidence failed to
establish any duress that would void the signing of the consent
form.'
The court's decision in Phillips, that the circumstances sur-
rounding Phillips' execution of the consent form did not void
her consent, is in accord with the view of courts holding that
duress by force of circumstances alone is not sufficient to invali-
date consent.' 2 The reasoning behind this view is that these cir-
cumstances are prevalent in most adoptions. If courts were to
107. Comment, Termination of Parental Rights in Adoption Cases: Focusing on the
Child, 14 J. FAm. L. 547 (1975).
108. 284 S.C. at 137, 325 S.E.2d at 535. The court accepted the definition of duress
stated in Cherry v. Shelby Mut. Plate Glass & Casualty Co., 191 S.C. 177, 4 S.E.2d 123
(1939): "[A] condition of mind produced by improper external pressure or influence that
practically destroys the free agency of a party and causes him to do an act or form a
contact not of his own volition." Id. at 183, 4 S.E.2d at 126.
109. Brief of Appellant at 8.
110. Brief of Respondent at 11-12. Respondents argued that the lawyer and social
worker had told Phillips that she need not sign the consent form for another 24 hours.
The respondent also relied on the fact that Ms. Phillips testified at trial that her lawyer
had gone over the terms of the consent with her and that she felt that she had under-
stood them at that time. Id.
111. 284 S.C. at 137, 325 S.E.2d at 535.
112. E.g., In re Surrender of Minor Children, 344 Mass. 230, 181 N.E.2d 836 (1962);
In re D., 408 S.W.2d 361 (Mo. Ct. App. 1966); In re Interest of G., 389 S.W.2d 63 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1965).
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allow withdrawal of consent each time duress involved the force
of circumstances, many adoptions in which consent is required
would be subject to challenge. 113 These challenges would create
uncertainty in many adoption proceedings.
In her second exception to the lower court ruling, the peti-
tioner argued that the court adopted an incorrect approach in
determining the best interests of the child. 114 Phillips main-
tained that the court should give the biological relation pre-
sumptive weight rather than emphasize the factors of the matur-
ity, morality, and economic status of the mother as compared to
that of the adoptive parents. Other jurisdictions have found that
the status of the natural parent is so vital in determining the
best interests of the child that it may offset, or even outweigh,
the cultural and material advantages the adoptive parents might
provide."" These courts, however, do not automatically accord
presumptive weight to the status of the natural parent. The bio-
logical relationship was considered only as an additional factor.
Where there was little difference in a comparison of cultural and
material factors, the blood ties were accorded sufficient weight
to tip the scales. 116
Another factor to be considered in determining the best in-
terests of the child is the effect that a withdrawal of a valid con-
sent might have upon a child's emotional security. Although the
court in Phillips never directly addressed the effect that a with-
drawal of consent might have had on the child, this concern is
implicit in the "best interest" test.117 Sarah had been in the cus-
tody of the adoptive parents for approximately two years when
the case reached the supreme court. In those two years, great
bonds of affection had developed. 1" 8 To break these ties and re-
store Sarah to her natural mother would likely have been trau-
matic to the child.
At least one other policy consideration reinforces the court's
113. See In re Surrender, 344 Mass. at 230, 181 N.E.2d at 836.
114. 284 S.C. at 135, 325 S.E.2d at 534.
115. See, e.g., In re D., 408 S.W.2d 361 (Mo. Ct. App. 1966); People ex rel. Scarpetta
v. Spence-Chapin Adoption Serv., 28 N.Y.2d 185, 169 N.E.2d 787, appeal dismissed and
cert. denied sub nom. Demartino v. Scarpetta, 404 U.S. 805 (1971).
116. See, e.g., In re D. 408 S.W.2d at 369.
117. See In re Adoption of Child, 114 N.J. Super. 584, 277 A.2d 566 (1971); In re
Revocation of Appointment of a Guardian, 360 Mass. 81, 271 N.E.2d 621 (1971).
118. 284 S.C. at 136, 325 S.E.2d at 535.
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decision in Phillips: the reliance factor. If natural parents could
withdraw their valid consents to adoption proceedings, prospec-
tive adoptive parents would be discouraged from pursuing adop-
tion as their rights toward the child would be subject to the will
of the natural parents.119 The Phillips court reinforces this argu-
ment by noting that "the trend is in favor of enforcing consent
when voluntarily given and accomplished by reliance on the part
of the adoptive parents."120
Although it may seem unfair that Phillips placed primary
emphasis on the comparative benefits and detriments to the
child in being brought up by a sixteen-year-old, unmarried
mother, and in being raised by "suitable" and "desirable" adop-
tive parents, this emphasis is in accord with the view that the
best interest of the child is the paramount concern. The inter-
ests of the child are the essence of an adoption proceeding where
the natural parent has given a valid consent, and any "unfair"
ramifications are only secondary. Thus, strong policy arguments
will force an objective consideration of what is in the best inter-
ests of the child.
Nancy E. Caldwell
V. JURISDICTION OF FAMILY COURT TO MODIFY A CHILD
CUSTODY DECREE OF A FOREIGN COURT
In Sinclair v. Albrecht121 the South Carolina Court of Ap-
peals examined the family court's jurisdiction to modify a child
custody decree of a New Hampshire court under the Uniform
Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA), adopted in South Car-
olina in 1981.122
Lynne and Leland Albrecht separated in 1981 while living
in New Hampshire. In December 1981 Lynne moved to
Orangeburg, South Carolina, bringing the child of the marriage
with her. Leland subsequently moved from New Hampshire to
Houston, Texas. On March 1, 1982, an initial divorce decree was
issued by a New Hampshire court with a permanent stipulation
119. Driggers v. Jolley, 219 S.C. 31, 64 S.E.2d 19 (1951).
120. 284 S.C. at 137, 325 S.E.2d at 535 (citations omitted).
121. 287 S.C. 20, 336 S.E.2d 485 (1985).
122. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 20-7-782 to -830 (1976).
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of joint custody. This stipulation gave physical placement of the
child to Mrs. Albrecht and visitation rights to Mr. Albrecht. The
divorce became final on January 4, 1983.2 s In December 1982
Mrs. Albrecht was hospitalized for a neurological illness. Mr. Al-
brecht was in South Carolina visiting the child while Mrs. Al-
brecht was hospitalized, and he declared an intention to return
to Texas with the child. In response, the child's maternal grand-
mother, who was caring for the child at the time, instituted an
action in South Carolina on the same day the New Hampshire
decree became final.
The family court found that it had jurisdiction and awarded
temporary custody to the maternal grandmother. 24 Mr. Al-
brecht appealed, challenging the jurisdiction of the South Caro-
lina family court under the UCCJA to hear the matter and mod-
ify the decree.'
2
5
The court's analysis focused particularly on two sections of
the South Carolina Code. The court first examined its jurisdic-
tion to hear the matter according to section 20-7-788 of the
South Carolina Code.128 The Albrecht court found that jurisdic-
tion existed since South Carolina was the "home state" of the
child and mother for more than a year at the time the action
was instituted and substantial evidence of the child's present
and future care existed here.
12 7
The court then examined its jurisdiction to modify the de-
cree of the New Hampshire court under section 20-7-810 of the
Code.128 In those states adopting the UCCJA, the specific lan-
guage of section 20-7-810 has been interpreted to give the court
that issues a custody decree continuing exclusive jurisdiction as
long as it can satisfy the jurisdictional requirements of section
20-7-788, despite the fact that a subsequent court could other-
wise claim jurisdiction. 29 Therefore, in order to hear this case, it
123. 287 S.C. at 21, 336 S.E.2d at 486.
124. Id., 336 S.E.2d at 486-87.
125. Id., 287 S.C. at 21-22, 336 S.E.2d at 487.
126. S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-788 (1976). This code section is identical to the parallel
section in the UCCJA. See UNIF. CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION ACT § 3, 9 U.L.A. 122
(1979).
127. 287 S.C. at 24, 336 S.E.2d at 488.
128. S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-810 (1976) provides that "a court of this State shall not
modify that decree unless (1) it appears . . . that the court which rendered the decree
does not now have jurisdiction ... and (2) the court of this State has jurisdiction."
129. See Bloodgood v. Whigham, 408 So. 2d 122 (Ala. App. 1981); Caskey v. Pickett,
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was necessary that the court find that South Carolina had juris-
diction over the matter and that New Hampshire did not.130
South Carolina clearly had jurisdiction under section 20-7-810
since South Carolina was the "home state" of the child at the
time the action was commenced. 131 The more significant issue,
however, was whether New Hampshire also could claim
jurisdiction. 132
The Albrecht court concluded that New Hampshire no
longer met the jurisdictional prerequisites of section 20-7-788 of
the Code since New Hampshire was no longer the child's "home
state" and none of the other parties resided there.13 3 In addition,
there was no showing of any other substantial connection be-
tween the parties and New Hampshire. It is a general rule that
when all parties involved have left the state which originally is-
sued the custody decree, other state courts need not defer to the
original state's jurisdiction.' Therefore, the assumption of ju-
risdiction by the South Carolina family court was proper and
consistent with the letter and the spirit of the statute.
Frank A. Schiller
274 Ark. 383, 625 S.W.2d 473 (1981); Fry v. Ball, 190 Colo. 128, 544 P.2d 402 (1975). See
generally Bodenheimer, Interstate Custody: Initial Jurisdiction and Continuing Juris-
diction Under the UCCJA, 14 FAM. L.Q. 203, 244 (1981).
130. 287 S.C. at 22, 336 S.E.2d at 487. In fact, New Hampshire did not decline juris-
diction in the matter, nor had it been notified of the South Carolina action.
131. S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-786(5) (1976) defines "home state" as "the state in which
the child immediately preceding the time involved lived with his parents, a parent, or a
person acting as parent, for at least six consecutive months ......
132. This deference to the prior court is deemed necessary to promote the objectives
of the section, specifically, to avoid jurisdictional competition and conflict between the
courts of various states, to avoid needless relitigation of issues, to discourage protracted
controversies over custody, and to promote cooperation among the courts of the several
states. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-784(a) (1976). As made explicit in the UCCJA, the
various provisions shall be construed to promote these purposes. S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-
784(b) (1976). With regard to jurisdictional requirements, "it has been emphasized that
these jurisdictional provisions should be applied in a manner consistent with the Act's
purpose of limiting rather than proliferating jurisdiction." Annotation, Validity, Con-
struction, and Application of Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, 96 A.L.R.3D 968,
981 (1979).
133. 287 S.C. at 23-24, 336 S.E.2d at 487-88.
134. Bodenheimer, supra note 129, at 215.
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VI. ARREARAGE IN CHILD SUPPORT OBLIGATIONS AT TIME OF
ADOPTION ARE NOT EXTINGUISHED WITH OTHER RIGHTS AND
DUTIES
In most instances, a final decree of adoption extinguishes all
rights and duties of a natural parent towards his child and re-
lieves the natural parent of all responsibility for the child.1 35 In
Napier v. Kilgore136 the South Carolina Court of Appeals cre-
ated an exception to this rule by holding that child support obli-
gations in arrears at the date of adoption are not excused by the
adoption decree.137 Although only a few other jurisdictions have
ruled upon this same issue, the decision in Napier is in clear
accord with these jurisdictions. 38
The natural mother of the child filed suit in family court
against her former husband to recover $2410 in unpaid child
support. 139 Prior to this action, the mother's new husband had
adopted the child with the consent of the natural father. Al-
though the natural father argued that any child support arrear-
ages were waived as a condition to his consent, the trial court
held that the father was liable for the arrearage and ordered
monthly payments of $100.140 The natural father appealed this
decision, claiming that the trial court erred in not terminating
all child support obligations, including any arrearages, at the
time of the adoption.1
4 1
The court of appeals interpreted section 20-7-1770 of the
South Carolina Code 142 to require a complete severance of all
ties between the child and the natural parent upon adoption.'43
The court reasoned that because child support payments be-
come a vested right when due, the natural parent is not retroac-
135. S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-1770(b) (1976).
136. 284 S.C. 313, 326 S.E.2d 171 (Ct. App. 1985).
137. Id. at 315, 326 S.E.2d at 173.
138. See cases cited infra note 146.
139. Transcript at 1.
140. 284 S.C. at 314, 326 S.E.2d at 172.
141. Transcript at 45.
142. S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-1770 (1976). This section provides in part: "After a final
decree of adoption is entered, the natural parents of the adopted child ... shall be
relieved of all parental responsibilities for the child and have no rights over such adopted
child." Id. § 20-7-1770(b).
143. 284 S.C. at 314, 326 S.E.2d at 172-73.
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tively relieved of accrued obligations by an adoption.144 In addi-
tion, the court stated that if the legislature had intended to set
arrearages aside upon adoption, the legislature "'would [have]
clearly and explicitly so provide[d].' 145
The court of appeals based its holding primarily on persua-
sive authority. The issue of extinction of obligations pursuant to
an agreement between the natural parents as a condition to con-
sent for adoption is infrequently addressed. Courts that have ad-
dressed the issue hold that child support vests as it accrues. 46
The primary difference between jurisdictions on the issue of
whether child support obligations vest when they accrue is
whether the arrearages must be reduced to a sum certain before
the adoption in order to be recoverable. 147 The court of appeals
in Napier ruled that the amount of arrearages need not be defi-
nitely ascertained; the debt need only exist.
48
Napier is also of interest since the decision marks the sec-
ond time in less than fourteen months that the court of appeals
has specifically reserved a ruling on whether an agreement be-
tween the natural parents, obtained as a condition for consent to
the adoption, would allow child support arrearages to be for-
given.149 In a footnote to Napier, however, the court of appeals
referred to South Carolina Supreme Court decisions holding
that the right of a minor child to support cannot be prejudiced
by an agreement between the parents. 150 Given this strong state-
ment of a child's right to support, along with the rule that child
support vests as it accrues, it is inferable that a South Carolina
court would likely hold that child support arrearages cannot be
excused by an agreement between the natural parents. Practi-
144. Id. at 315, 326 S.E.2d at 173.
145. Id. (quoting C. v. R., 169 N.J. Super. 168, 404 A.2d 366 (Cb. Div. 1979)).
146. See Pittman v. Pittman, 419 So. 2d 1376 (Ala. 1982); Bethell v. Bethell, 268
Ark. 409, 597 S.W.2d 576 (1980); Sanford v. Sanford, 273 Cal. App. 2d 535, 78 Cal. Rptr.
144 (1969); Sample v. Poteralski, 169 Ga. App. 448, 313 S.E.2d 145 (1984); Vail v. Vail,
98 Ill. App. 2d 234, 240 N.E.2d 519 (1968); Howard v. Howard, 191 So. 2d 528 (Miss.
1966).
147. See, e.g., C. v. R., 169 N.J. Super. at 176, 404 A.2d at 370.
148. 284 S.C. at 315, 326 S.E.2d at 173.
149. Id. at 314, 326 S.E.2d at 172; Peebles v. Disher, 279 S.C. 611, 310 S.E.2d 823
(Ct. App. 1983).
150. 284 S.C. at 314 n.1, 326 S.E.2d at 172 n.1 (citing Lunsford v. Lunsford, 277 S.C.
104, 282 S.E.2d 861 (1981); Peebles v. Disher, 279 S.C. 611, 310 S.E.2d 823 (Ct. App.
1983)).
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tioners should be aware, however, that there is a division of
opinion in other jurisdictions on this issue, and persuasive au-
thority exists both for and against the validity of such an
agreement. 151
The South Carolina Court of Appeals has reaffirmed the im-
portance of the prompt payment of child support obligations by
holding in Napier that child support obligations vest as they ac-
crue and that the natural parent's arrearages are not automati-
cally extinguished by a decree of adoption.
William W. Pollock
VII. VISITATION RIGHTS OF NATURAL GRANDPARENTS
In Chavis v. Witt 52 the South Carolina Supreme Court af-
firmed a family court ruling that granted visitation rights to the
natural grandparents of an adopted child.153 The Chavises, re-
spondents in the action, sought the right to visit their
grandaughter, Natasha, who was the child of their deceased son.
Appellant Mrs. Witt, the mother of the child, remarried after
her former husband died; she subsequently discontinued the re-
lationship with the paternal grandparents.'5 Her new husband,
Raymond Witt, adopted the child shortly after their marriage.
On appeal from the family court, Mrs. Witt argued that the
Chavises lacked standing to assert visitation rights under section
20-7-420(33) of the South Carolina Code.'55 Section 20-7-420(33)
presupposes the existence of grandparenthood.' 56 Mrs. Witt ar-
gued that the Chavises were no longer the grandparents of
Natasha since their status as grandparents had been extin-
151. Compare Henderson v. Henderson, 55 N.C. App. 506, 286 S.E.2d 657 (1982),
aff'd, 307 N.C. 401, 298 S.E.2d 345 (1983)(holding that an agreement to excuse alimony
payments is governed by contract law; consent of family court needed for a valid con-
tract) with Skinner v. Skinner, 252 Ga. 512, 314 S.E.2d 897 (1984)(child support decree
cannot be modified retroactively; modification can only be made by the court, not
through agreement of the parties).
152. 285 S.C. 77, 328 S.E.2d 74 (1985).
153. Id. at 80, 328 S.E.2d at 75.
154. Id. at 78, 328 S.E.2d at 74-75.
155. S.C. ConE ANN. § 20-7-420(33) (1976) provides that the family court shall have
exclusive jurisdiction "to order periods of visitation for the grandparents of the child."
156. See id.
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guished by section 20-7-1770.157 Section 20-7-1770 provides that
the natural parent or parents of a child have no rights over the
child if that child is subsequently adopted. 15 8 Mrs. Witt rea-
soned that because the natural father's rights toward Natasha
had been divested upon the decree of adoption, the rights of his
blood relations had also been extinguished. Since the Chavises
no longer held the status of grandparents, Mrs. Witt asserted
that section 20-7-420(33) was inapplicable to them.159
The supreme court refused to interpret section 20-7-1770 as
extinguishing the relationship of the paternal grandparents. 0
The court distinguished situations in which a natural parent had
consented to termination of parental ties or the state had termi-
nated parental ties, and those in which the natural parent's rela-
tionship had been terminated by death. Thus, the court held
that "when a parent dies, the relationship of the grandparents to
the child is not obliterated"'' and that "the adoption statute
does not preclude the granting of visitation rights to grandpar-
ents when their son or daughter has not consented to
157. S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-1770 (1976).
158. Section 20-7-1770 reads as follows:
(a) After the final decree of adoption is entered, the relation of parent and
child and all the rights, duties and other legal consequences of the natural rela-
tion of child and parent shall thereafter exist between such adopted child and
the person adopting such child and the kindred of the adoptive parents ...
(b) After a final decree of adoption is entered, the natural parents of the
adopted child, unless they are the adoptive parents, shall be relieved of all
parental responsibilities for the child and have no rights over such adopted
child.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-1770 (1976).
159. 285 S.C. at 79, 328 S.E.2d at 75. Other jurisdictions have interpreted their state
adoption statutes in a similar manner. See In re Adoption of Gardiner, 287 N.W.2d 555,
558 (Iowa 1980)(an adoption decree that operates to divest a natural parent a fortiori
may divest a nonparent); see also Lee v. Kepler, 197 So. 2d 570 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1967); Browning v. Tarwater, 215 Kan. 501, 524 P.2d 1135 (1974); Bikos v. Nobliski, 88
Mich. App. 157, 276 N.W.2d 541 (1979); Acker v. Barnes, 33 N.C. App. 750, 236 S.E.2d
715, cert. denied, 293 N.C. 360, 238 S.E.2d 149 (1977).
160. 285 S.C. at 79, 328 S.E.2d at 75.
161. Id. (emphasis added). The court leaves open the issue of whether visitation
rights would be granted to the grandparents when both of the parents die. For a discus-
sion of the difference between the situation in which both of the natural or adoptive
parents of a minor are deceased and the situation in which the minor is adopted by one
of the natural parents and a new spouse, see Lingwall v. Hoener, 108 Il. 2d 206, 483
N.E.2d 512 (1985)(construing the provisions of the Illinois Adoption Act, ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 40, para. 1521 (1980)).
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adoption. ' '162
The passage of section 20-7-420(33) by the South Carolina
Legislature reflects the current nationwide trend of state legisla-
tures to provide for grandparental visitation when one of the
former spouses is precluded from visitation because of divorce or
death."l 3 Courts in jurisdictions that have such statutes have
used the visitation rights "as a flexible device to promote the
child's welfare. ' 16 4 The policy behind the grandparental visita-
tion legislation and court decisions is that there is no reason to
presume that the termination of a grandparental relationship is
in the child's best interest. Nor is there any reason to view the
continuation of that relationship as an unnecessary intrusion in
the lives of the reconstituted family.165 Instead, the grandpar-
ents should be allowed an opportunity to show that the best in-
terest of the child would be supported by the continuation of
their relationship. Chavis is significant because it reflects a judi-
cial willingness, at least in certain cases, to recognize grandpa-
rental rights that are not dependent on the status of a child's
parent.
Nancy E. Caldwell
VIII. CLARIFICATION OF CHANGED CIRCUMSTANCES DOCTRINE
The changed circumstances which might give rise to an ali-
mony adjustment according to section 20-3-170 of the South
Carolina Code are more clearly defined after the South Carolina
Court of Appeals decision in Baker v. Baker.16 In Baker the
court held the following: (1) unwarranted debts alone do not es-
tablish changed circumstances; (2) inflation which affects both
payor and payee is insufficient to establish changed circum-
stances; and (3) increases in the payor's income, even though
substantial, do not require that the payee's alimony be in-
162. 285 S.C. at 79, 328 S.E.2d at 75.
163. In 1976 few states had legislation concerning the issue of grandparental visita-
tion rights. By 1982 at least 40 states had enacted statutes concerning the visitation
rights of grandparents. Lingwall, 108 Ill. 2d at -, 483 N.E.2d at 517 (1985).
164. Morse v. Daly, 101 Nev. 320, 327, 704 P.2d 1087, 1091 (1985); see also Reeves v.
Bailey, 53 Cal. App. 3d 1019, 126 Cal. Rptr. 51 (1975).
165. Lingwall, 108 Ill. 2d at -, 483 N.E.2d at 516.
166. 286 S.C. 200, 332 S.E.2d 550 (Ct. App. 1986).
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creased. 167 Areas delineated by the Baker court as insufficient to
constitute changed circumstances within the language of the
statute'68 are the same as those noted by commentators in the
domestic relations field.1
6
1
Mr. and Mrs. Baker were divorced in 1977 on grounds that
Mrs. Baker's habitual drunkenness constituted constructive de-
sertion. An agreement between Mr. and Mrs. Baker by which
Mr. Baker was to pay Mrs. Baker $950 per month alimony was
included in the trial court's order. Mrs. Baker also received half
the proceeds from the sale of their home and a car.170 Upon Mrs.
Baker's petition in 1979, the family court increased the payment
order to $1150 per month plus an additional 10% of any bonus
received by Mr. Baker minus $24,000. The court justified the in-
crease by the fact that Mr. Baker's bonuses, often 30% to 50%
of his base salary, were not included in the original agreement.'
7'
The order was again modified in 1981. The family court
judge amended the alimony payment to $1475 per month. This
modification represented a 55% increase over the original award
and a 28% increase over the 1979 modification. From 1977 to
1981, Mr. Baker's income from salary and rental properties in-
creased by 29.6%.172
In its review of this second modification, the court of ap-
peals determined that an increase over the 1979 modification
was unwarranted.'7 3 The court acknowledged that Mrs. Baker
had incurred additional debts, was adversely affected by infla-
tion, and desired to share in Mr. Baker's sizeable increases in
salary. 74 The court noted, however, that Mrs. Baker's debts
were a result of personal mismanagement of funds. The court
added that there was no evidence that Mrs. Baker's normal ex-
167. Id. at 203, 332 S.E.2d at 552.
168. S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-3-170 (1976) allows for modification of an award of ali-
mony based on the "changed circumstances and the financial ability of the supporting
spouse .... "
169. See H. CLARK, THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES § 14.9,
at 461 (1968). See generally Annotation, Change in Financial Condition or Needs of
Husband or Wife as Ground for Modification of Decree for Alimony or Maintenance, 18
A.L.R.2D 10 (1951).
170. Brief of Respondent at 1.
171. 286 S.C. at 202, 332 S.E.2d at 552.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 203, 332 S.E.2d at 552.
174. Id.
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penses had increased. Furthermore, inflation had affected both
of the Bakers. Finally, the court emphasized that alimony is not
to be used as an endowment or profit-sharing plan."7 5
The Baker court's opinion appears to be sound. There is,
however, ground for differing with the result. While the majority
stated that no one of the three arguments listed was sufficient in
and of itself to establish changed circumstances, there is room to
question whether the cumulative result of the three factors
could amount to changed circumstances.
Although the court properly discounted their value in evalu-
ating the need for an increase in payment, there are several fac-
tual considerations which would support the increase in alimony.
Since 1979, inflation eroded Mrs. Baker's fixed income while Mr.
Baker's nearly kept pace.'"6 Thus, Mrs. Baker's standard of liv-
ing could not so nearly approximate the 1979 level allowed by
the original court order as could Mr. Baker's. To maintain Mrs.
Baker's pre-inflation level of income, the difference would have
had to come from Mr. Baker's increased income in the form of
increased alimony to Mrs. Baker. Mr. Baker would then have
had to bear the full brunt of inflation. Although the size of his
income might have suggested that he could have best afforded to
bear that burden, the court made it clear that such socialization
is not the purpose of alimony.
Additionally, while Mrs. Baker's normal living expenses
may not have increased from 1979 to 1981, since 1982 she had
been rigorously fighting alcoholism which began in the late years
of her marriage. Her treatment had been expensive. The record
further indicated that she alone had contributed substantially to
her young, recently emancipated sons' financial needs during
hardships they had encountered.'"7
The court of appeals reversed the order requiring Mr. Baker
to pay Mrs. Baker's attorney's fees. The court indicated that it
found the fees excessive since the sole issue on appeal was the
changed circumstances of the parties over a two-year period.'1 8
The court noted that financial ability to pay is not determina-
175. Id. (citing H. CLARK, supra note 169, at 461).
176. Id. at 205, 332 S.E.2d at 553 (Gardner, J., dissenting).
177. Id. at 207, 332 S.E.2d at 554 (Gardner, J., dissenting).
178. Id. at 204, 332 S.E.2d at 552.
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tive of who is to bear the burden of the fee.10 Hence, the court
declared Mrs. Baker liable for an equal portion of the fee.
The Baker decision left certain issues unresolved. It is un-
clear whether minor children will be able to share in the in-
creased wealth of a parent after a divorce. Also unresolved by
this decision is the issue of whether significant decreases in sala-
ries should continue to support a decrease in alimony under the
South Carolina changed circumstances statute.180 In addition,
the court did not address Mr. Baker's argument that the infla-
tion issue was an improper topic for court consideration because
no formal inflation tables were offered into evidence. The court
also left unaddressed the arguments advanced concerning the
propriety of considering elements other than changed circum-
stances in the alimony adjustment.
Baker limits the extent to which a payee spouse can assert
changed circumstances to support a modification of an alimony
award by limiting the consideration of inflation, payor spouse in-
come increases, and new debts. Baker v. Baker, therefore, places
a greater burden on a payee spouse seeking an increase in ali-
mony to show disadvantageous changes in his or her financial
status.
Nancy S. Rights
179. Id.
180. S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-3-170 (1976).
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